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Would declining exit rates from welfare 
provide evidence of welfare dependence  
in homogeneous environments? 
 
Dalit Contini and Nicola Negri 
  
 
Negative duration dependence in the exit rate from social assistance is an important issue 
addressed in the dynamic welfare participation literature. If heterogeneity is properly modelled, 
the decline of the exit rate is ascribed to a progressive reduction of the capability to get off 
welfare due to the detrimental effects of the benefit as time in welfare increases (Blank, 1989; 
Sandefur and Cook, 1998; Dahl and Lorenzen; 2003; Gangl, 2003, Chay et al, 2005).  The aim of 
this paper is to show that the potential corruptive effects of benefits are not easily identified with 
this analytical strategy. As a starting point we develop a model, coherent with the Bane and 
Ellwood (1994) theoretical framework, that describes the causal links occurring between 
work/unemployment, poverty and social assistance. A simulation study is carried out in order to 
show that negative duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare may arise in environments 
where no corruptive effects of benefits are at work, even in the absence of heterogeneity at the 
onset of the process. Thus, negative duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare does not 
imply ‘welfare dependence’: the observed pattern may be due to effects of persistence in poverty 
or in unemployment.  
 
Introduction  
The duration of economic subsidies paid out by public assistance is an important characteristic 
distinguishing different local welfare systems (Saraceno, 2002). The idea is that  systems 
characterised by long welfare spells are not effective, costly and therefore inefficient. Moreover, 
according to the ‘welfare trap’ theory, long spells may itself constitute a cause of poverty, as 
recipients may develop dependence on the subsidy reducing the chances of becoming   2
autonomous from public support. In this perspective, systems providing long-term benefits are 
judged negatively not only because they are considered less efficient in solving beneficiaries’ 
problems, but also because this inefficiency exacerbates their situation. 
The exit rate from welfare is thus a widespread subject of analysis in the welfare dynamic 
participation literature. The underlying assumption is that if subsidies have a corrupting effect, 
individual exit probabilities should diminish as time in assistance increases. In the following 
sections we argue, instead, that negative duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare is not 
necessarily a consequence of welfare dependence, even in the absence of unobserved 
heterogeneity
1.   
As a starting point, we develop a model that illustrates the possible causal links occurring 
between the domains of work/unemployment, poverty and social assistance. The model is 
coherent with the framework developed by Bane and Ellwood (1994), according to which self-
sufficiency from public support may be difficult to reach as a consequence of different 
behavioural models, emphasizing respectively: choices and incentives, confidence and control, 
values and culture. Our model ‘dissects’ (Hedström, 2005) the effects between unemployment, 
poverty and social assistance with respect to individual opportunities, preferences, and 
expectations. We claim that the behavioural mechanisms of Bane and Ellwood are potentially 
activated by all the domains under study: a welfare recipient could have a hard time becoming 
autonomous not because he receives the benefit, but simply because he is poor or unemployed. 
Thus, the model is useful for distinguishing the effects of benefit receipt from other factors 
which are not related to the welfare program. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we briefly review the empirical 
literature on welfare dependence and deal with the issue of negative duration dependence in the 
exit rate from welfare. We discuss the arguments provided in the literature to explain negative 
duration dependence, highlighting some inconsistencies in this line of reasoning. The qualitative 
model linking work/unemployment, poverty and social assistance is then developed. A   3
simulation exercise based on a simplified version of the previous model is carried out with the 
aim of showing that negative duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare may be observed 
in environments where no corruptive effects of benefits are at work. Conclusions follow. 
 
Welfare dependence in the literature  
The most common definition of welfare dependence focuses on the length of individual welfare 
spells, with longer episodes taken as representing greater dependence (Gottschalk, Moffit; 1994)
2. 
Although the concept of welfare dependence is generally related to the amount of time spent on 
welfare, the causal effect of the subsidy is frequently referred to. The idea is that a prolonged 
period on welfare may be the result of the detrimental effect of the benefit itself on recipients’ 
choices and behaviour.  
One major strand of the literature has focused on evaluating the work disincentives of 
income support programs, i.e. the negative effects of welfare transfers on labor supply (Dazinger 
et al, 1981; Ermish and Wright, 1990; Hoynes, 1996; see also Moffit, 1992, Moffit, 2002 and 
Blank, 2002 for extensive surveys). Reference is to classic economic theory according to which 
individuals – subject to the constraints given by actual work opportunities and welfare policies – 
choose whether to work and how much to work following the principle of utility maximization. 
Most of the empirical studies, largely referred to the U.S. program AFDC
3, exploit time and 
cross-state variation in the benefit level
4 for identification of the impact of the programs. The 
focus is on assessing the absolute magnitude of the labor supply reduction due to benefit receipt 
by comparing labor market behaviour at different benefit levels (Moffit, 2002). This body of 
work as a whole confirms that transfer programs considerably reduce work effort. Recent studies 
deal with the incentive effect of welfare reforms, the role of work requirements, sanctions, time 
limits, education or training programs (for example: Moffit, 2003; Van den Berg et al; 2004).   
Another strand of the literature is that of welfare participation. The effects of specific 
features of policies, such as the level of benefits on welfare participation at a point in time (for   4
static models) and on entry/exit rates from welfare (for dynamic models), are estimated  As 
regards exit rates in particular, the aim is to assess the indirect effect of the benefit level on 
welfare spell length – if people reduce work effort because of the subsidy, time in welfare should 
increase (Blank, 1989; Hoynes and MaCurdy, 1994, Fortin et al, 2004). Across the studies there is 
empirical evidence that as the amount of the subsidy increases, participation and entry rates also 
increase, while exit rates drop.  
A number of dynamic participation studies (O’Neill et al, 1987; Blank, 1989; Sandefur and 
Cook; 1998; Walker and Shaw, 1998; Gustaffson and Voges; 1998; Gustaffson et al, 2002; Dahl 
and Lorentzen, 2003; Gangl, 2003; Chay et al, 2005) address the issue of negative duration 
dependence in the exit rate from welfare. Some authors define the concept of welfare 
dependence in this sense (Blank, 1989; Walker and Shaw, 1998; Sandefur and Cook, 1998). The 
term ‘negative duration dependence’ means that the longer the time spent in welfare, the more 
difficult it is to exit. The decline of the exit rate is related to the reduction of the capability to get 
off welfare – due to the detrimental effect of the benefit – as time in welfare passes. Thus, the 
focus of the statistical analyses is the shape of the hazard function of time on welfare
5, or, with a 
similar perspective, of the transition intensity from welfare to a stable working position (Dahl and 
Lorentzen, 2003; Gangl, 2003)
6. 
But identification of the shape of individuals’ hazard and transition functions is not a simple 
task (Lancaster, 1990). An empirical decreasing exit rate may be due to ‘state dependence’ (the 
causal effect of time already spent in welfare) or it may be a spurious effect, due to unobserved 
heterogeneity
7. This problem is clearly acknowledged in the empirical welfare evaluation 
literature. For example, Dahl and Lorentzen (2003, 519) argue that: “The heterogeneity 
hypothesis claims that beneficiaries with less resources and more problems tend to stay on 
assistance, while those who are better off tend to leave after a short while. The time dependency 
hypothesis maintains that time on social assistance influences beneficiaries’ attitudes and 
behaviours in detrimental ways. As time passes claimants lose self-efficacy, morale, motivation or   5
skills”. In this light, the aim of the empirical work is to consistently estimate the shape of the exit 
rate, having controlled for all potential sources of heterogeneity – individual differences and 
features of the context – which could obscure the ‘true’ causal relation between time spent in 
welfare and the exit probability from welfare
8.  
The purpose of this paper is to show that estimation of the causal effect of time in welfare 
over the probability of exiting welfare cannot be successfully accomplished through analysis of 
the shape of the hazard function – even by controlling for individual differences – because other 
identification issues arise if the complex nature of the process governing welfare dynamics is not 
properly taken into account.  
 
Effects of time on welfare and negative duration dependence    
The behavioural explanation provided for negative duration dependence in the exit rate from 
welfare is that: “[…] people’s attitudes and behaviour change over time in response to living on 
benefit and this, in turn, makes it increasingly difficult for them to leave. […] claimants may no 
longer bother to look for work, or may have lost the habit of work that appeals to prospective 
employers” (Leisering and Leibfried, 1998).  
In their influential paper on welfare dependence, Bane and Ellwood (1994) state: “The term 
dependency  is used quite loosely in public discussion and most academic work […].  Both the 
popular and the academic treatments of dependency have, in general, been flawed by incomplete, 
inconsistent, or non-existent behavioural models.” Reviewing the literature, they provide a 
theoretical framework highlighting the reasons for possible detrimental role of time in assistance. 
They propose three models: the rational choice model, the expectancy model and the cultural model.  
The rational choice paradigm motivates most of the empirical studies on work disincentives. 
Individuals evaluate the available options and select the option with the highest utility: thus, long-
term welfare use is the result of a series of reasoned choices. The expectancy model is related to 
individuals’ sense of self-esteem. Dependency may result when people lose a sense of control   6
over their lives, ceasing to believe that they can make it without welfare. The cultural model, 
strictly related to the ‘culture of poverty’ theory, claims that living in environments where most of 
the people rely on welfare instead of work may favour the change of attitudes and mores, and the 
development of a different system of values. According to Bane and Ellwood, it is the expectancy 
model in particular that assumes that the longer the time on welfare the harder it is to get off, 
because confidence and self-esteem are expected to decay with time in the system. The cultural 
model – maintaining the role of the living environment – also suggests that actions may be 
subject to change with time spent on welfare. On the other hand, the difficulty of leaving welfare 
ought not to vary with time on the program under the rational choice model.     
But what are the mechanisms triggering these effects on recipients’ behaviour?  
Let us go back to the viewpoint of Dahl and Lorentzen (2003). They maintain that time on 
welfare causes loss of skills. In a similar fashion, Sandefur and Cook (1998, 764) argue that: “To 
understand whether welfare may be a trap, it is important […] to look more carefully at why some 
recipients use welfare for long periods of time. […] The reasons for this may be that (1) a 
woman’s skills deteriorate […], (2) the stigma […] grows stronger […], (3) the intensity of searching 
of jobs […] decreases over the duration of welfare receipt […]”. Again, reference is to 
deterioration of skills as one of the intervening effects in the causal relation (welfare as a trap) 
between income support policy and the capability of going back to work. In his influential review 
of the literature on evaluation of welfare programs in the USA, Moffit (1992, 26) argues that: 
“Such dependence [negative duration dependence] could arise from the deleterious effects of ADFC 
receipt itself, as might happen if human capital deteriorates from lack of se as the spell progresses 
[…]. Yet another explanation […] is a spurious statistical result arising from the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity”
9. In this case the causal relation between benefit receipt and exit from 
welfare (deleterious effects of AFDC) is assumed to take place because of the intervening effect of 
human capital deterioration.  
We do not find these arguments completely persuasive:    7
(i)  Skill loss and human capital deterioration occur as a consequence of being out of the 
labour market, and not directly because of the welfare benefit: unemployed people who 
are not eligible for income support are also exposed to these risks. If a causal link 
between welfare participation and unemployment does exist, this link should be more 
clearly specified.    
(ii)  Stigma may arise as a consequence of living on public support, but also whenever a 
person’s standard of living is too far below that of the majority of the people around 
him, i.e. because of poverty.  
(iii)  Job search reduction may indeed take place because people develop an opportunistic 
attitude towards the subsidy, but also because of loss of self-confidence, which may 
result as a response to being out of the labour market or in a condition of economic 
deprivation. Is job search reduction then ultimately due to welfare, or is it due to 
unemployment or poverty  themselves? 
If it is true that in most cases being in welfare implies being poor– most income support policies 
do not take people out of poverty - and that it may also denote being unemployed (although the link 
may be weaker), then we should agree that observed persistence in welfare could be the 
consequence of persistence in poverty or in unemployment. The distinction is crucial if the aim 
of the empirical research is to evaluate the negative causal effects of income support policies. 
There seems to be a need for a more precise causal model – linking unemployment, poverty and 
social assistance receipt – to disentangle these effects. A qualitative version of such a model is 
developed in the next section. 
We may add that, aside from identification issues, the analysis of the shape of the exit rate 
from welfare could be a relevant topic of investigation only if the interventions are ‘according to 
need’ (Saraceno, 2002), so that beneficiaries receive help as long as the need persists (this is the 
case of northern European welfare systems, of France and Germany, but also of the very strongly 
category-based AFDC program
10 in force in the USA until 1996). Instead, in regimes subject to   8
budget constraints, a household may find its subsidy revoked even if its economic situation has 
not improved. Thus, welfare spell length is a relevant outcome for evaluating dependence if it is 
affected exclusively by beneficiaries’ behaviour. What would otherwise be the semantic value of a 
prolonging of assistance episodes? Who are the agents involved: welfare recipients, who are less 
willing to find a job, or social workers, who can intervene in a discretionary way to regulate 
resource allocation? 
 
Linking unemployment, poverty and social assistance 
In Figure 1, U indicates the area of unemployment while S indicates ‘protected unemployment’, 
that is periods in which a worker receives non-means-tested benefits which are guaranteed by 
contract in case of job loss. P represents poverty; A represents public social assistance, that is the 
period during which an individual receives means-tested income support financed by the state 
and granted to poor households. The arrows indicate the effects (positive or negative) that each 
area potentially exercises on the others or on itself. We say ‘potentially’ because some of the 
effects are not obvious, and their being or not being at work is often an issue of empirical 
research. The model may not illustrate all the possible interdependencies among unemployment, 
poverty and assistance, but only those analytically relevant to the present discussion.  Thus, it has 
a merely heuristic value. 
(Figure 1  here) 
 
 
Loss of income due to unemployment (arrow a) 
Not receiving a salary the individual and his family may slide into a condition of poverty. Timing 
and intensity of the fall into poverty depend on household’s characteristics: presence of other 
working members, availability of savings, solidarity of relatives. The presence of non-means-  9
tested unemployment benefits guaranteed for certain categories of workers is also relevant. 
Relations e, f, f ’ intervene here: we will return to them later. 
 
Access to social assistance benefits (arrow b)  
Household poverty is a condition for access to means-tested assistance. The relation is not 
deterministic: there can be situations of assistance without poverty and poverty without 
assistance. The latter may be due to eligibility rules or to take-up behaviour among the eligible. 
Institutional factors affect both aspects.  
Eligibility rules. The level of poverty giving entitlement to benefits varies across public 
assistance regimes and often lies below the national poverty threshold. Moreover, welfare regimes 
can have a universalistic or a category-based orientation (Saraceno, 2002). In the latter case there can 
be discrimination between ‘deserving’ and ‘non-deserving’ poor, and social services may require 
economic need to be qualified by circumstances such as incapacity to work, presence of small 
children, etc.. Time limits also affect entitlement to benefits: under some regimes income support 
can be interrupted even when poverty persists.   
Take-up rate. Propensity to turn to social services may be related to obligations and sanctions 
that may be imposed on welfare recipients. Psychological factors may also intervene alongside 
with institutional factors: stigma may cause a sense of shame, preventing individuals from 
claiming public assistance; the so-called ‘institutional anorexia’ may hinder poor people from 
obtaining information about their personal rights, or exploiting them fully.  
Access to social assistance is also affected by the existence of informal rules working at the 
local level, thus by how policies are actually implemented. 
 
Unemployment persistency (arrow c) 
With prolonged time in unemployment, the individual slips backwards in the queue of 
‘employability’ making reinsertion in the labour market more difficult
11. Various mechanisms can   10
generate this effect. As elapsed time in  unemployment grows longer, skills become obsolete; 
social contacts facilitating the match between labor supply and demand loosen (Granovetter, 
1995); potential employers become mistrustful. Persistence in unemployment may also be due to 
psychological factors: unemployment can demoralize and ‘discourage’ the jobless individual to 
the point where he simply stops looking for work.  
 
Income effect of welfare benefits (arrows b’+a’) 
The probability of leaving unemployment is affected by current and expected income (arrow a’). 
Arrow b’ stands for the income gain provided by social assistance (subsidies may not  eliminate 
poverty, but at least reduce its intensity). The income effect of social assistance on 
unemployment is represented by the combined effect of b’+a’. As maintained by classical 
economic theory, benefit provision increases reservation wage and reduces hours of work: the 
larger the subsidy and the longer its expected duration, the less individuals are attracted by work. 
Note that the work disincentive may be partially outweighed by substitution effects when the 
benefit-reduction rate, a tax on earnings while on welfare, is lowered
12.  
From the opposite perspective, being in poverty may instead reinforce unemployment. First, 
poverty may compromise the capacity to sustain job-search costs (information, communication, 
transportation, substituting time dedicated to domestic care). Second, in the long run poverty 
may oblige individuals to accept any kind of job, even precarious,  unskilled, physically exhausting 
and harmful to health, thus increasing marginalization from the labor market. In this light, social 
assistance benefits may enable interruption of the vicious circle of poverty and unemployment. 
 
Psycho-social effects of welfare benefits (arrow d)  
The relation represents the potential corruptive
13 effect of time on welfare related to 
psychological and cultural factors (Bane and Ellwood, 1994). Living on public support, which in 
certain cultural contexts is equated with living on charity, exposes the individual to social   11
disqualification and stigma, imprisoning him in marginal social networks and isolating him – 
even more than unemployment – from those social contacts which help to gain access to work 
opportunities.    Demoralization and learned helplessness may also take root, favouring the 
reduction of the intensity of job-search. Moreover, when individuals live in situations of socio-
economic exclusion and spatial segregation, they may progressively internalize behavioural 
models typical of the so-called ‘poverty culture’, according to which poor people learn to manage 
without a regular job. Values and attitudes are affected if the majority of the neighbours relies on 
welfare rather than work. Thus, preferences may change, making work less attractive.  
In neo-classical economics individuals’ preferences are taken as given, and the budget line 
describing available options is only subject to exogenous changes. Both these assumptions must 
be relaxed if we wish to acknowledge for psycho-social factors
14. 
 
Psycho-social effects of poverty (arrow a’’) 
Prolonged time in poverty induces very similar mechanisms – related to stigma, loosening of 
social networks, loss of confidence, changes of values – to those described for time elapsed on 
welfare, but have different policy implications. For this reason, it is important to keep them well 
distinct. We will  return to this point. 
 
Effects related to unemployment benefits (arrows e, f and f’) 
Workers who lose their job may be entitled to non-means-tested income support guaranteed for 
certain categories of unemployed (arrow f), which can prevent or slow the fall into poverty (arrow 
e). Unemployment benefits may provide a work disincentive similar to that of social assistance, 
although the effect is likely to be stronger, as the subsidy is more generous in this case. On the 
other hand, benefits can sustain job-search costs and human capital investments. Like social 
assistance, unemployment benefits can have demoralizing effects (arrow f’). However, since these 
benefits are often seen more as a right, they are generally not particularly stigmatizing.    12
 
Policy implications 
The assessment of institutional effects has relevant policy implications. Work disincentives, 
related to the income effect of the benefit, have been extensively studied. Nowadays, the major 
concern is to ‘make people work’, by increasing tax reduction rates, introducing obligations, 
sanctions, time limits.  
On the other hand, psycho-social effects of welfare benefits, as we will see in the following 
section, are difficult to evaluate. The reason is that many of the factors leading to a reduction in 
the chances to leave unemployment (stigma, changes of values, loss of confidence) may be 
ascribed to different domains of the model. The effects related to loss of self-confidence, for 
example, can occur because of unemployment (arrow c), or because of income deprivation (arrow 
a’’), or as a consequence of living on public support (arrow d). In all of these cases, difficult to be 
considered as clearly distinct, loss of confidence leads to a reduction in the chances to leave 
unemployment. But policy implications are different. If this effect is due to poverty – i.e. not 
being able to reach the standard of living of the majority - the benefit, providing more income, 
should have empowerment effects, encouraging self-sufficiency. On the other hand, if the effect 
is due to living on welfare – i.e. not being able to make it on your own - receiving income support 
will reduce the chances to find a job: active labor market programs should be endorsed in this 
case, as the way in which supplementary income is provided is critical for the success of the 
policy.   
 
Simulation exercise  
We carry out a simulation experiment aimed at showing  that negative duration dependence in 
the exit rate from welfare does not imply the existence of a causal effect of the benefit on 
working life courses, even in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. The idea is that negative 
duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare could instead be due to persistence in poverty   13
or in unemployment. Welfare spells are generated under the assumption that no corruptive 
effects of social assistance are at work: it will be shown that negative duration dependence in the 
exit rate from welfare may turn up also in this context. 
  Let’s make a very extreme assumption: that social assistance, instead of providing real money, 
assigns people pieces of paper with no legal value. Moreover, let this ‘social assistance’ be granted 
to the same people and with the same rules applying as for real welfare benefits. Obviously, in 
this environment individual behaviour cannot be affected by the cash transfer. In particular, with 
reference to the model in fig. 1: 
(a)  There are no income effects (no b’ arrow), implying that social assistance does not 
provide work disincentives . 
(b)  Time on welfare does not have any effect on self-confidence or attitudes (no d arrow). 
Moreover we will ignore unemployment benefits in order to simplify the exposition.  
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
 
Let current working condition – and possibly also past unemployment history – affect 
current poverty status, and let past poverty history and past unemployment history affect the 
current working condition: 
( ) past past t P U f U , =          t h r o u g h   c, a’ and a’’   (1a) 
( ) past t t U U f P , =      t h r o u g h  a      (1b) 
Given the recursive structure of (1a) and (1b), by repeated substitution of Upast and Ppast   in 
equation (1a) we obtain the following:    
( ) past t P f P =           ( 2 )  
representing the net effect of relations a, a’, a’’’ and c. In addition:   14
( ) past t t P P f A , =       t h r o u g h  b      (3) 
The starting point of the simulation study is the reduced form version of the behavioural model 
depicted in fig. 2, given by (2) and (3). This specification, being still adequate for the present 
purpose, allows a simple simulation design.  
We take a set of identical individuals, all of whom are poor at time t=1 (so that there is no 
heterogeneity at the onset of the process). We impose that they all follow the same process 
probability rules. We let past poverty experience positively affect the probability of current 
poverty, thus assuming the existence of a vicious circle of poverty. Let’s discuss this condition. 
Equation (2) represents a net effect of different relations: arrow c, representing persistence in 
unemployment, implies a positive effect (unemployment as a cause of future unemployment); 
arrow a, income loss due to unemployment, is also a positive relation (unemployment as a cause 
of poverty). On the other hand a’ – the income effect of poverty on unemployment – may be 
positive, as income deprivation may reduce the efficiency of job search, or negative, as it may 
raise the probability of accepting a job, through the decline of the reservation wage. Psycho-social 
effects due to poverty (arrow a’’), taking place as time in poverty grows longer, are positive 
(poverty as a cause of future poverty).  
Thus, the net effect of past poverty on current poverty is theoretically undetermined. 
Nevertheless, the body of theoretical and empirical literature on persistence of poverty does 
highlight that a major concern for social scientists is that past poverty may cause more future 
poverty (Stevens, 1999; Devicienti, 2002; Giraldo at al, 2003), implying that all relations entering 
equation (2) could represent altogether a vicious circle
15. 
Poverty and welfare histories have been generated for 5000 hypothetical individuals, for 3650 
time units (we may think of this as daily data, recorded for 10 years). Such a large number of time 
units generates nearly continuous duration data.  
Equation (2) is specified as:   15
{}
) ) ( 1 2 1 1 0 ( 1
1
| 1 Pr
P t Dur t P past t
e
P P




where  () P Durt  represents the amount of time elapsed in poverty within the present spell at time 
t. We take  0 1 ≠ γ . Thus, if  0 2 ≠ γ ,  t P  depends only on previous state  1 − t P , otherwise  t P  
depends on elapsed duration in poverty at time t-1. Equation (3) is set as follows:   
{} 0 0 | 1 Pr = = = t t P A  
{} () ) ( 1 0 1
1
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P Dur past t t
t e
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δ δ + − +
= = =  
Under this specification, all welfare recipients are poor. If  1 δ  is set to zero, probability of welfare 
participation depends on present poverty status; if  0 1 ≠ δ  it depends on elapsed time in poverty. 
Four different specific process models have been employed:  
model 1:  0 2 = γ ,  0 1 = δ   
model 2:  0 2 ≠ γ , 0 1 = δ   
model 3:  0 2 = γ ,  0 1 ≠ δ   
model 4:  0 2 ≠ γ ,  0 1 ≠ δ . 
Given the aim of the simulation study, we wish to obtain a relevant number of welfare spells: 
thus, parameters have been set in such a way that most individuals eventually receive social 
assistance benefit. Parameters are non-negative: past poverty reinforces future poverty. More 
specifically
16, in equation (2): 65 6 0 . = γ  and 16 0 1 . = γ  for all models;  0 2 = γ  in models 1 and 3 
and  025 0 2 . = γ  in models 2 and 4 (for example, if a person is poor one day, probability of being 
steadily poor for at least one year is approximately 67% in models 1 and 3, and 75% in models 2 
and 4). In equation (3),  8 6 0 . = δ  for all models, while  0 1 = δ  in models 1 and 2 and  025 0 1 . = δ  
in models 3 and 4 (this implies, for example, that in model 1, a person who becomes poor will 
have a 45% probability of experiencing at least one year in welfare thereafter).   16
After generation of poverty and welfare spells data regarding poverty were discarded. The 
hazard function:  
() ()
dt
t T dt t T t P
t h dt
≥ + < ≤
= →
|
lim 0  
for first welfare spells was estimated with the non-parametric method of Kaplan-Meier. T is 
welfare spell length. A graphical representation of the estimated integrated hazard: 
() ( ) ∫ = −
t
du u h t S
0
ˆ ˆ ln  
was obtained for each of the four data sets generated from the models described in table 2. If exit 
rates do not depend on time – i.e. durations follow an exponential distribution – the function 
should be close to a straight line. 
Results 
The estimated integrated hazard is nearly a straight line only  for model 1 (fig. 3). We observe 
a departure from the linear function for models 2 and 3, while model 4 definitely exhibits a 
concave shape. Notice that a concave functional form for  ( ) t S ln −  implies a decreasing hazard 
function, i.e., negative duration dependence in the exit rate. 
 
 
(figure 3 here) 
 
 
More formally, we also employ different non-parametrical tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
Anderson-Darling, Cramer-Von-Mises
17) for the null hypothesis that spell durations follow an 
exponential distribution. The percentage of times the null hypothesis is rejected at given 
significance levels has been calculated for each model. If the distribution of spell duration is 
indeed exponential, this percentage should be close to the corresponding significance value. On 
the contrary, if the percentage appears to be much higher than the significance value, there is   17
strong empirical evidence of the existence of duration dependence. Results are summarised in 
table 1, and refer to 100 replications for each case. The percentage of rejections is close to 
significance levels only in model 1. When current poverty or welfare use are assumed to depend 
on elapsed duration in poverty, it rises steeply, almost reaching 100% in model 4, where both 
equations of the model comprise duration effects. 
 
(table 1 here) 
 
 
Conclusive remarks  
(i)  The analytical strategy based on the shape of the welfare hazard function is frequently 
employed to test the subsistence of corruptive effects of welfare benefits that tend to 
cumulate with time (psycho-social effects, relation d, fig 1). As we have shown, negative 
duration dependence in the exit rate from welfare does not imply the existence of such 
effects, nor does it imply the existence of any causal effect of being on welfare on working 
condition. Exit rates from welfare may in fact exhibit negative duration dependence even 
when welfare cannot possibly affect individual behaviour and choices – and in a perfectly 
homogeneous environment. We conclude that assessment of the existence of corruptive 
effects of welfare benefits should not be based on the shape of the hazard function, even 
when heterogeneity is taken under control. These effects are generally not identifiable with 
data on welfare spells only. We will discuss alternative strategies in the next section.  
(ii)  As we have just stated, the problem – a problem of identification – is not related to the 
classical unobserved heterogeneity v.s. true dependence issue. Let’s reconsider this 
assessment. Consider a homogeneous population at time t =1, and a process in and out of 
poverty, governed by the same rules for all individuals. Because of random luck (or bad luck), 
the population will become heterogeneous as time goes by. A person who becomes poor at 
the beginning might experience a higher probability of being poor in the future compared to 
a more fortunate person who has not fallen into poverty yet. Thus, even if heterogeneity is   18
not present at the onset of the process, it will show up with time, being represented by  
individual’s past poverty and unemployment history. If longitudinal data on income and work 
are available, ‘cross-career effects’ among the domains of welfare, poverty and unemployment 
could be investigated. But when data come from administrative archives of social assistance, 
only welfare spells are available. The additional source of heterogeneity is not observable in 
this case.  
Would the techniques conventionally adopted to control unobserved heterogeneity 
solve the problem in this context? Probably not. Standard techniques involve the 
introduction of a time-invariant random component representing neglected heterogeneity, 
thus, are extremely useful for dealing with unobserved characteristics that do not change or  
change little in time. On the other hand, the heterogeneity we are dealing with here is 
intrinsically time-varying: providing a reasonable ad hoc specification for such a time-varying 
random component seems to be quite a difficult task.  
 
Comparing unemployment exit rates 
The shape of the exit rate from welfare, describing the relation between past and future social 
assistance participation, represents a very indirect causal link, given by the net effect of all the 
arrows connecting unemployment, poverty and social assistance (fig. 1).
  Moreover, as the 
simulation exercise demonstrates, negative duration dependence can have alternative 
explanations, not always congruent with the welfare dependence perspective.  
Let’s go back to the general model previously discussed. Welfare benefits can have a negative 
effect on recipients’ behaviour through: (i) an indirect income effect
18, causing work effort to 
decline (arrow b’+a’); (ii) a direct effect – growing with time on welfare – on the probability to 
exit unemployment, due to cultural and psycho-social factors (arrow d). Both these effects deal 
with the way social assistance influences the domain of work/unemployment. In this light, any   19
assessment of the effects of welfare should focus directly on the relation between benefit receipt 
and labor market behaviour, in line with the tradition in the literature on work disincentives.  
The relevant conceptual framework for the evaluation of welfare dependence is that of the 
impact evaluation literature (Heckman et al, 1999), according to which the causal effect of a program 
should be evaluated with counterfactual reasoning. If the aim is the evaluation of the ‘impact on 
the treated’, i.e. how program participation affects recipient’s behaviour
19, an outcome measure of 
the impact for recipients should be contrasted with that of an appropriate comparison group
20. In 
principle, the evaluation design could be based on the comparison between assisted poor vs. 
unassisted poor
21 –  in order to assess the impact of a specific intervention with respect to the 
situation where no program is at work –  or between assisted poor in different welfare programs, 
for example programs that allocate different amounts of benefit
22. Techniques for controlling 
unobserved heterogeneity are also relevant in this context.  
In this framework, let’s try a simple line of reasoning. Assume that we can find a group of 
non-recipient poor who are not too different from recipients, and that these differences can be 
taken under control. We could compare the exit rates from unemployment for the two groups, the 
relevant question being: does benefit receipt reduce this exit rate? (Contini and Melis, 2002; 
Terracol, 2004)
23. Evidence of welfare dependence is provided if, ceteris paribus, non-recipients 
leave unemployment more rapidly than recipients, i.e. the exit rate for non-recipients is higher 
than that of recipients. Notice that welfare dependence is not related to the shape of the exit rate 
from unemployment, thus it does not imply negative duration dependence
24.  
If heterogeneity is properly taken into account, this strategy does allow for correct inference 
on welfare dependence. We question whether the following issue can be addressed as well: to 
what extent is welfare dependence due to income effects or to psycho-social effects?  
We have argued that psycho-social effects develop with time elapsed on welfare, while 
income effects are not time-dependent. Thus, identification of the former could be attained by 
comparing unemployment exit rates of long and short-term assisted (including currently elapsed   20
time on welfare as a time-varying covariate). Evidence of psycho-social effects is provided if 
work effort decays with time on welfare. But, once again, a significant coefficient for elapsed time 
on welfare does not prove the existence of detrimental effects of the benefit. As time spent in 
welfare can also stand for time in poverty, separating the psycho-social effect due to time in 
welfare (type d effects) from that due to time in poverty (type a’’ ) can be difficult
25.  
If data on poverty spells are also available, a time-varying covariate representing the relevant 
features of individual’s past poverty history could be added to the model. But this requires: first, 
that poverty and welfare spells are not nearly overlapping, and this is not usually the case in 
universalistic welfare systems. Second, that elapsed time in poverty and elapsed time on welfare 
are additive effects, which seems to be quite a strong assumption.  
We conclude that ‘dissecting’ the effects underlying welfare participation is extremely 
important in order to identify - from a theoretical point of view - the different mechanisms at 
work: on one hand, distinguishing negative effects of the benefit from those related to conditions 
different from that of being a welfare recipient; on the other hand, distinguishing the different 
modes of welfare dependence. Nevertheless, the above discussion highlights that the empirical 
assessment of the different mechanisms has no simple general solution: very rich data archives 
are required and  evaluation designs must be strictly related to institutional and cultural factors, 
thus, have to be deeply rooted into the local environment.  
 
Notes 
1. It is well known from the econometric literature that negative duration dependence may be a spurious effect due 
to unobserved heterogeneity. The point we want to make is that factors other than that of unobserved heterogeneity 
make identification of the effects of welfare a difficult task when the empirical analysis is based on the shape of exit 
rate from welfare.     
2. Since many recipients experience more than one spell, some studies focus on total time on welfare in a given time 
interval, or on the fraction of total income that derives from welfare over a fixed time period (Moffit, 1992; 
Gottschalk and Moffit, 1994). 
3. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the main income support for the poor in the USA, specifically designed to 
support lone mothers with children. The program was replaced in 1996 by the more restrictive program Temporary 
Aid for Needy Families.        
4. Differences among states in the potential maximum benefit level under the AFDC program were very marked; 
moreover this level underwent significant changes in the 1960s to ‘80s period (Moffit, 1992).   21
5. Let T be the duration of the welfare spell. The hazard function (also called ‘exit rate’) describes the instantaneous 
exit probability given survival to time t and is given by  () ( )
dt
t T dt t T t P
dt t h
≥ + < ≤
→ =
|
0 lim . 
6. Evidence supporting the existence of negative duration dependence is not compelling: in a few studies such 
dependence does not appear to be statistically significant (Blank, 1989; Fitzgerald, 1991; Walker and Shaw, 1998, see 
also Bane and Elwood, 1994). 
7. We consider a group of people, heterogeneous with respect to the level of ‘ability’ and identical for everything else, 
receiving subsidies in the same period. Let’s observe the exit rate from assistance. The original group includes able 
and less able: the rhythm of exit from assistance is relatively fast at first. As time passes, the group of beneficiaries 
grows smaller, the more able having found work. Hence only less able individuals are left. Even in the absence of 
corruptive effects of assistance on beneficiaries’ behaviour, we observe an exit rate decreasing over time.   
8. Some authors (Sandefur and Cook, 1998; Dahl and Lorentzen, 2003) introduce a random component in order to 
take into account unobserved heterogeneity. 
9. Moffit on the other hand claims that this approach is not well supported by economic theory. 
10. As long as eligibility conditions are still met. Empirical research shows that exits from AFDC  are often due to 
marriage or to the fact that women no longer have eligible children (Bane, Elwood; 1994). 
11. There is an extensive econometric literature addressing the problem of the existence of true negative duration 
dependence in the exit rate from unemployment, i.e. the possibility that the longer people stay out of the labor 
market, the more difficult re-entry would be.  
12. The income effect may instead be stronger for mothers, as the cost of child care will constitute and additional 
‘tax’ on labor supply. 
13. Arrow d can also represent a positive effect of the subsidy on work, in cases where financial benefits are 
integrated with activation measures aimed at reinsertion in the labor market. 
14. In Bane and Ellwood (1994) the term  ‘psycho-social’ refers to the ‘expectancy’ model only. Here the label 
includes the effects of the ‘cultural’ model as well.     
15. We are aware that this concern is sometimes related to the potential negative effect of welfare on poverty (the 
‘welfare trap’, which in this restricted version of the model cannot take place). Nevertheless persistence of poverty 
may also occur for psychological and cultural reasons not related to the benefit. 
16. Similar results are obtained with different values of the parameters (with the same sign). Other parameter 
configurations are not shown: purpose of the simulation study is merely to provide a counterexample to the general 
‘theory’ that negative duration dependence should imply welfare dependence. 
17. Given the length of the observation window, only very few right censored first spells are found. 
18. A positive effect may be at work as well, if the subsidy has empowerment effects (supporting the costs of job-
search and alleviating negative psycho-social effects of income deprivation). 
19. Some studies focus instead on the global impact of the program, which also involves ‘entry effects’ (non-eligible 
changing behaviour in order to become eligible) and substitution effects.   
20. The counterfactual is represented by the (average) outcome which would have occurred to the ‘treated’ if they 
had not been treated. Under certain (often untenable) assumptions, the counterfactual can be consistently estimated 
by the (average) outcome of a convenient comparison group, or by that of the treatment group before 
implementation of the program. The former strategy implies the existence of a proper comparison group (i.e. the 
absence of selection bias on unobservables); the latter, the possibility of keeping control over the ongoing changes in 
the environment.  
21. The strategy is difficult to pursue in systems with universalistic orientation (Saraceno, 2002) where it is rare to 
find non-assisted poor. Recipients and non-recipients have intrinsic differences in ‘category-based’ assistance 
regimes, where eligibility rules refer not only to the economic condition, but also to other circumstances (for 
example, the household’s composition): this occurs in US programs AFDC and TANF, but also in Italy and 
Germany (Bonny, Bosco; 2002). In all cases, if recipients and non-recipients differ with respect to unobservable 
characteristics, the problem of  ‘selection bias’ has to be dealt with. 
22. Most of the studies on welfare dependence do not strictly refer to the impact evaluation framework. One  
exception is Fortin et al (2004), which exploits an exogenous change occurred in the Canadian Quebec-Welfare 
Program, thus considered a ‘natural experiment’.  
23. A ceteris paribus reasoning is not easy. Contini and Melis (2002) - referring to the Italian assistance regime where 
norms regulating access to benefits leave social workers a wide margin of discretionality and the transfer is not 
always ‘according to need’ - compare the behaviour of recipients when receiving the benefit with that of the same 
recipients at times when they are not assisted. Terracol (2004) evaluating the French universalistic policy Revenu 
Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) program, employ as a comparison group the eligible non-recipients, as not all the eligible 
claim the benefit. In order to deal with the endogenous nature of participation given eligibility, the author jointly 
estimates the equation for the exit rate from unemployment spell and the equation explaining take-up behaviour by 
eligible agents. 
24. This effect may instead be represented by arrow c in fig.1. 
25. Policy implications are quite different in the two cases. 
   22
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to … 
Financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research for the 




Bane M., Elwood D. (1994). Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press. 
Blank R. (1989). Analyzing the Length of Welfare Spells, Journal of Public Economics, 39, 245-274. 
Blank R. M. (2002). Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, Journal of Economic Literature, 
XL, 1105-1166.   
Bonny Y. Bosco N. (2002). Income support  measures for the poor in European cities, Saraceno 
(eds), Social Assistance Dynamics in Europe: National and Local Poverty Regimes, The Policy 
Press, Bristol, 81-125. 
Bosco N., Contini D., Negri N. (1999). Out of welfare: functioning of income support in Torino, 
Quality and Quantity, 33, 243-260. 
Buhr P., Weber A. (1998). Social assistance and social change in Germany, in Leisering L. e 
Walker R. (eds), The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, Bristol, The Policy 
Press, 183-198. 
Chay K. Y., Hoynes H., Hyslop D. (2005). A non-experimental analysis of true state 
dependence in monthly welfare participation sequences, Journal of Econometrics, 
forthcoming  
Contini D., Melis N. (2002). I sussidi assistenziali inducono dipendenza? Evidenze dall’archivio 
sui residenti in edilizia pubblica, Statistica Applicata, 12, 197-225. 
Dahl E., Lorentzen T. (2003). Explaining exit to work among social assistance recipients in 
Norway: heterogeneity or time dependency?, European Sociological Review, 19, 5, 519-536. 
Dazinger S., Haveman R., Plotnick R. (1981). How income transfers affect work, savings and the 
income distribution, Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 3, 975-1028. 
Devicienti F. (2001). Poverty persistence in Britain: a multivariate analysis using the BHPS, 1991-
1997, Journal of Economics, Suppl. 9, 1-34. 
Ermish J. F., Wright R. E. (1991). Welfare benefits and lone parents’ employment in Great 
Britain, The Journal of Human Resources, 424-456.   23
Fitzgerald J. (1991). Welfare durations and the marriage markets. Evidence from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, The Journal of Human Resources, 545-561. 
Fortin B., Lacroix G., Drolet S. (2004). Welfare benefits and the duration of welfare spells: 
evidence from a natural experiment in Canada, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1495-1520.  
Gangl M. (2003). Tra sussidio sociale e mercato del lavoro: un’analisi empirica nella Repubblica 
Federale Tedesca, in Alcock P. e Siza R. (eds), La Povertà Oscillante, Sociologia e Politiche 
Sociali, 6, 2, 147-167. 
Giraldo A., Rettore E. , Trivellato U. (2001). The persistence of poverty: true state dependence or 
unobserved heterogeneity? Some evidence form the Italian survey on household income 
and wealth”, Working Paper n. 40, Progetto COFIN 1999 “Occupazione e disoccupazione in Italia: 
misura e analisi dei comportamenti”. 
Gottschalk P. e Moffit R. (1994). Welfare Dependence: Concepts, Measures, and Trends”, 
American Economic Review, 84, 2, 38-42. 
Granovetter M. (1995). Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2
nd edition. 
Gustaffson B., Muller R., Negri N. and Voges W. (2002). Paths through (and out) social 
assistance, in Saraceno C. (eds), Social Assistance Dynamics in Europe: National and Local 
Poverty Regimes, The Policy Press, Bristol, 173-234. 
Heckman, J., LaLonde, R. and Smith, J. (1999) “The Economics and Econometrics of Active  
Labor Market Programs”, Handbook of Labor Economics , 3A, 1865-2097, North-Holland 
Hedström P. (2005). Dissecting the Social: on the Principles of Analytical Sociology, Oxford University 
Press.  
Hoynes H., MaCurdy T. (1994). Has the Decline in Benefits Shortened Welfare Spells?, American 
Economic Review, 84, 2, 43-48. 
Lancaster T. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Leisering L., Leibfried S. (1999). Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Leisering L., Walker R. (1998). Making the future: from dynamics to policy agenda, in Leisering 
L. e Walker R. (eds) (1998). The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, The 
Policy Press, Bristol, 265-285. 
Leisering L., Walker R. (eds) (1998). The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, The 
Policy Press, Bristol. 
Moffit R. (1992). Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: a Review, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 30, 1-61.   24
Moffit R. (2002). The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, NBER Working Paper 
N° 8749. 
Moffit R. (2003). The role of non-financial factors in exit and entry in the TANF program, The 
Journal of Human Resources, XXXVIII Supplement, 1221-1254  
Negri N., Saraceno C. (1996). Le politiche contro la povertà in Italia, il Mulino, Bologna. 
O’Neill J.A., Bassi L.J., Wolf D.A. (1987). The duration of welfare spells, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 241-248.   
Sandefur G. D., Cook S. T. (1998). Permanent Exits from Public Assistance: the Impact of 
Duration, Family and Work, Social Forces, 77, 2, 763-787. 
Saraceno C. (eds.) (2002). Social Assistance Dynamics in Europe: National and Local Poverty Regimes, The 
Policy Press, Bristol. 
Shaw A., Walker R. (1996). Disjointed interaction: the labour market and the benefit system, in 
Meadows P. (eds), Work out or work in?, York Publishing Service/Joseph Rowentree 
Foundation, York, 87-115. 
Stevens A. H. (1999). Climbing out of poverty, falling back in: measuring the persistence of 
poverty over multiple spells, Journal of Human Resources, 34, 3, 557-588. 
Terracol A. (2004). Welfare programs and unemployment duration in France, unpublished 
preliminary version  
Van der Berg G. J., Van der Klaauw B., Van Ours J.C. (2004). Punitive sanctions and the 
transition rate from welfare to work, Journal of Labor Economics, 22, 1, 211-241.  
Walker R., Ashworth K. (1998). Welfare benefits and recession in Great Britain, in Leisering L. e 
Walker R. (eds) (1998), The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, The Policy 
Press, Bristol, 199-220. 
Walker R., Leisering L. (1998). New tools: towards a dynamic science of modern society, in 
Leisering L. e Walker R. (eds) (1998), The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, 
The Policy Press, Bristol, 17-33. 
Walker R. e Shaw A. (1998). Escaping from social assistance in Great Britain, in Leisering L. e 
Walkr R. (eds) (1998), The dynamics of modern society: Poverty, policy and welfare, The Policy 
Press, Bristol, 183-198. 
 
   25
Authors’ Addresses 
Dalit Contini, Università di Torino, Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata, Piazza 
Arbarello, 8, 10122 Torino, dalit.contini@unito.it 
Nicola Negri, Università di Torino, Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Via S. Ottavio 50, 10124 
Torino, nicola.negri@unito.it 
 
  